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ABSTRACT
The central aim of this paper is to examine the constitutionality of Ni-geria’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF) which was established in August 
2012, pursuant to the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (Establish-
ment etc) Act 2011 (the NSIA Act). The paper reviews and discusses how 
questions on the constitutionality of a sovereign wealth fund have been dealt 
with in other jurisdictions with similar legal and governmental structures. It 
reviews practices in the United States and Canada, where the establishment 
of SWFs conform to their federal constitutional designs; and in Australia 
and Russia, where the law and practice of SWF are similar to the extant 
regime in Nigeria. 
This paper argues that questions on the constitutional basis of the SWF 
alone should not affect the establishment of a national SWF in Nigeria and 
therefore recommends a constitutional amendment to clear the grey areas. 
It discusses the importance of the law and development approach in resolv-
ing the identifiable setbacks in the Nigerian NSIA Act bearing in mind the 
potentials of the SWF in the socio-economic development of the Nigeria.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There appears to be a low level of understanding of the concept of sover-eign wealth fund (SWF) in Nigeria, which is partly owing to the paucity 
of literature on the subject. Those who have a general idea of the concept 
associate it with a kind of stabilization fund – a sovereign savings fund.1 
While this is to some extent correct, the concept of SWF goes beyond a sta-
bilization fund. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute has comprehensively 
described SWF as:
 [S]tate-owned investment fund composed of financial as-
sets such as stocks, bonds, real estate, or other financial in-
struments funded by foreign exchange assets. These assets 
can include: balance of payments surpluses, official foreign 
currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, gov-
ernmental transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, and/or re-
ceipts resulting from commodity exports. Sovereign wealth 
funds can be structured as a fund, pool, or corporation. 
The definition of sovereign wealth fund exclude, among 
other things, foreign currency reserve assets held by mon-
etary authorities for the traditional balance of payments 
or monetary policy purposes, [S]tate-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in the traditional sense, government-employee pen-
sion funds (funded by employee/employer contributions), 
or assets managed for the benefit of individuals.2
In line with the foregoing description, the International Working Group 
of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) has defined SWFs as ‘special purpose in-
vestment funds or arrangements, owned by the government.’3 
Three key elements stand out in the above definition of SWFs. The first is 
the ownership element. SWFs are owned by the government, which includes 
1 This is the intendment of the Excess Crude Account (ECA). However, the concept of SWF 
goes beyond a government budget stabilization fund which is resorted to in times of drop 
in commodity (oil) prices.
2 Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute ‘Public release: 2nd quarter transparency result’ (April 
– June 2011) <www.swfinstitute.org/what-is-a-swf/> accessed 30 July 2011; see also Inter-
national Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally 
Accepted Principles and Practices (Santiago Principles) International Working Group of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds 2008 3.
3 Santiago Principles (n 2) 27. 
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both central government and regional governments. The second is invest-
ment element: the investment strategies of SWFs include investments in for-
eign financial and domestic assets (infrastructures). The third is purpose 
and objective element: the government establishes SWFs for macroeconomic 
purposes. SWFs are created to invest government funds to achieve fiscal and 
socio-economic objectives, and may have liabilities that are only broadly 
defined, thus allowing SWFs to employ a wide range of investment options 
with a medium to long-term time frame. They are also created to serve ob-
jectives other than, for example, reserve portfolios held only for traditional 
balance of payments purposes.4 It is important to make three observations 
concerning SWFs. First, the commodity from which foreign exchange assets 
or surpluses may be earned for the purpose of funding an SWF include both 
oil and non-oil commodities. That is to say, the policy initiative for an SWF 
need not be necessarily based on receipts from oil commodity; as it may 
be receipts from a variety of non-oil commodities. This means that non-oil 
producing countries may elect to establish SWFs. 
Second, a SWF may be established even without the availability of a 
commodity. Foreign exchange assets or assets simpliciter may be derived 
for the purpose of funding SWF from fiscal surpluses, which are conse-
quences of conscious and deliberate government policy capable of reflect-
ing positively on macroeconomic outlook.5 Third, SWF assets are separate 
and different from official reserves managed by monetary authorities of the 
States, which establish them.6 
In order to understand the philosophy behind the concept of SWF, it is 
important to ask the question: What does the modern State owe its citizens? 
The answer is simply to provide unmet needs which are central to the so-
cio-economic obligations of the State to its citizens – basic obligations such 
as access to food and drinkable water, health care, decent housing, qual-
itative education, social and personal security, et cetera. These socio-eco-
nomic obligations are not the subjects of discourse in this paper, rather the 
constitutionality of a national SWF for Nigeria is. As this paper will later 
show, Nigeria’s SWF passes the two constitutional tests for the validity of 
its establishment. However the issue of the funding of the SWF from the 
4 ibid.  
5 S Griffith-Jones and JA Ocampo ‘Sovereign wealth funds: A developing country perspective’ 
(paper presented at the workshop on Sovereign Wealth Funds, London, February 2008) 8; 
see also DK Das ‘Sovereign-wealth funds: The institutional dimension’ (2009) 56(1) Intl 
Rev Econ 85, 87- 8. 
6 See generally, US Department of the Treasury Semiannual Report on International Eco-
nomic and Exchange Rate Policies (June 2007).
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federation account may pose a constitutional problem for Nigeria’s SWF 
to the extent of denying the citizens of the much needed socio-economic 
goods which the SWF may afford. For as rightly noted by Keenan, SWF 
is expected to serve two masters with private and public agenda.7 When 
used as an investment vehicle in the international financial market place, it 
is expected to operate as a private business only interested in profits, but 
at the domestic level (in the State where it is created), an SWF is ‘purely 
an instrument of public policy whose chief justification is to improve so-
cial welfare in the [S]tate. To citizens, a well-run SWF should become a 
reliable source of income that drives economic and social development.’8 
By addressing the socio-economic needs of its citizens, the State may well 
claim to have met its ‘contractual’ obligations to the citizens irrespective of 
whether socio-economic rights are constitutionalized or not, while at the 
same time upholding human rights, considering that one of the concerns of 
international law is for States to respect, fulfill and protect human rights 
using appropriate legal instruments. 
It has been argued that in situations where the State fails in its obli-
gations, social debt is in arrears9 and needs to be paid. Therefore, it may 
also be argued, and rightly so, that the motivation for the establishment of 
Nigeria’s SWF is to satisfy the social debt which the Nigerian State owes its 
citizens. And if this is the case, it then follows that the legal or constitution-
al issues affecting the establishment of the SWF in Nigeria should not be 
allowed to derail the smooth and proper implementation of its programmes 
or policies.
This paper examines Nigeria’s SWF – the conception process, the con-
stitutive law and related issues and policy objectives – in section 2. In sec-
tion 3, the constitutionality of Nigeria’s SWF is examined with the argument 
that whereas the federal government, through the National Assembly, has 
the power to legislate for the good governance of the country as exhibited 
in the establishment of a national SWF, the issue of funding the SWF from 
the federation account is unconstitutional. In other words, the NSIA Act or 
the SWF cannot be said to be unconstitutional except to the extent that any 
provision of the NSIA Act is in conflict with the Constitution. Section 4 ex-
plores the concept of SWF from a comparative perspective using four juris-
dictions where federalism is practiced as a form of government, to highlight 
7 P Keenan ‘Sovereign wealth funds and social arrears: Should debts to citizens be treated 
differently than debts to other creditors?’ (2009) 49(2) Virginia Journal of International 
Law 431, 432.
8 ibid 433. 
9 ibid 455.
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the potentials of an efficiently managed SWF. It then concludes in section 5 
with proposals for legislative action by the National Assembly in order to set 
Nigeria’s SWF on a sound legal foundation.
2. NIGERIA’S SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND
In 2004, the administration of former President Olusegun Obasanjo es-tablished the Excess Crude Account (ECA) into which oil revenues sold 
above budgetary benchmark were paid. The ECA was not backed by law; 
consequently since its establishment there has been a raging controversy 
between the federal government and the 36 state governments over the le-
gality and constitutionality of the ECA.10 Not surprisingly, in 2008, and 
more recently in 2011, the 36 state governments instituted legal actions to 
prevent the federal government from operating the ECA and making unilat-
eral deductions from the account.11 It is pertinent to note that in 2011, the 
federal government withdrew the USD 1 billion, used as seed money for the 
newly established SWF, from the ECA.12 And despite the legal controversy 
surrounding the establishment of a national SWF, the federal government 
proceeded to constitute the management of the Nigeria Sovereign Invest-
ment Authority, which is responsible for managing the SWF.13 
10 According to Ike-Okoh, ‘[t]he excess crude account had existed at the Central Bank [of 
Nigeria] since the [General] Babangida administration. In fact, it was that account that 
came to be popularly referred to as the ‘Gulf War Windfall’, which later became a subject 
of a probe panel headed by Pius Okigbo. Notwithstanding, the uproar over the account, 
the succeeding military administrations of General Sani Abacha and General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar continued to maintain it as it served as a kind of slush fund for extra-bud-
getary expenditures of the federal government at the pleasure of the Head of State. In 
1999, President Obasanjo inherited the account, whose existence was also in breach of 
section 162 of the Constitution but nonetheless, the federal government maintained and 
operated it with the only difference being that occasionally, fund was drawn from it to 
augment the budgets of all the tiers of government on the approval of the president.’ C 
Ike-Okoh ‘Facts You Can’t Ignore About the Excess Crude Account, Consolidated Revenue 
Fund’ (28 November 2011) <http://businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/business-intel-
ligence/30200-facts-you-cant-ignore-about-the-excess-crude-account-consolidated-reve-
nue-fund > accessed 18 August 2012.
11 Presently, there are multiple suits between the states and the federal government at the Su-
preme Court of Nigeria seeking judicial pronouncements on the unconstitutionality of the 
ECA and the SWF. 
12 An additional USD 550 million dollars from accruals of the over-subscribed USD 1 billion 
Eurobond issued by the federal government of Nigeria in 2013 was injected into the SWF in 
2014. See N Francis, ‘FG injects $550m into sovereign wealth fund’ This Day Live (Lagos, 
11 February 2014).
13 See ‘FG picks management team for sovereign wealth fund’ Business Day (Lagos, 28 Au-
gust 2012).
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The conception process
In 2010, while the legal battle in respect of the ECA instituted by state governments was still pending at the Supreme Court of Nigeria, the Na-
tional Economic Council (NEC)14 approved a plan to replace the ECA with 
a national SWF. However, the state governors (six of whom were members 
of a committee set up to work out the legal framework of the SWF) were 
unyielding as to the source of funding for the SWF. Despite the failure to 
unanimously agree on the source of funding the proposed SWF, on 10 Sep-
tember 2010, President Jonathan sent a Bill to establish the SWF to the 
Senate. And on 26 May 2011 (after the Bill was passed by the Senate and 
the House of Representatives on 11 May 2011 and 19 May 2011 respec-
tively), the president signed the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Act (NSIA 
Act), which established the national SWF, into law. In October 2011, the 
36 state governments returned to court to stop the federal government from 
withdrawing USD 1 billion from the ECA to the Authority as ‘seed money’ 
for the national SWF. 
After failing to stop the state governments from proceeding with the 
lawsuit, the federal government decided to enter its defence in the case. 
However, when the matter came up for hearing at the Supreme Court in 
March 2012, the federal government pleaded with the Court to allow it 
seek out-of-court settlement with the plaintiffs (state governments). It is im-
portant to note, at this point, that the federal government has continued to 
operate the ECA side by side with the SWF.15
The underlying philosophy for the policy of a national SWF is basically 
necessitated by the need to prudently utilize the revenues derived from oil 
and gas to meet the needs of the present and future generations as well as 
provide economic stabilisation for government.16 Besides the need for pru-
dent utilisation of oil revenues, the establishment of Nigeria’s SWF appears 
to provide an opportunity for the federal government to introduce some 
form of legality, accountability and transparency in the management of the 
country’s oil revenues. With the ECA, the management of oil revenues was 
14 The National Economic Council is one of the federal executive bodies established in s 
153(1) (h) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) Cap 
C23 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (the1999 Constitution or the Constitution). It 
comprises the vice president as chairman, state governors, and the governor of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria – see item 18 of the third schedule to the 1999 Constitution. 
15 The state governments were dissatisfied with this and immediately instituted a suit at the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria to restrain the federal government from further doing so. They 
have also asked the Court to declare both the ECA and SWF unconstitutional.
16 O Aganga quoted in A Monk ‘Deep thoughts by Olusegun Aganga’ (Oxford SWF Project, 
University of Oxford, 10 March 2011).
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prone to illegality, abuse and shrouded in secrecy. So much so that it was 
‘used to pay for phantom contracts. [And served as] a ready source for extra 
budgetary spending which circumvent due process and constitutionalism.’17 
Some known cases of illegal withdrawals from the ECA include part of the 
USD 12.4 billion paid to the Paris Club creditors to eliminate Nigeria’s debt 
between October 2005 and April 2006; routine payments totaling over USD 
3.9 billion in 97 tranches for non-performing contracts under the National 
Integrated Power Projects (NIPPs) between December 2005 and June 2007; 
and the additional funding for two days extension of the 2006 census to the 
tune of USD 17.3 million in March 2006.18 
Most sovereign investment funds invest in inter-generational schemes 
or projects as their resources are derived mainly from non-renewable assets. 
This is an important and relevant point, which Nigeria’s SWF managers 
must bear in mind, as successive Nigerian governments have used ill-con-
ceived policies and projects – which provide mostly short-term benefits – as 
gateways to personalize State assets.19 It is rather regrettable that it took 
the Nigerian State 53 years (1958 – 2011) to realize the need for a develop-
ment fund intended to benefit the present and future generations of citizens. 
While the state governors are tackling the federal government over the es-
tablishment and funding of a national SWF, Ghana, even before selling the 
first drop of oil enacted a piece of legislation detailing what was to be done 
with its oil earnings. Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Act of 2011 
(in principle conceived as an SWF) provides for the establishment of a Petro-
leum Holding Fund for the deposit of all petroleum receipts, a Stabilisation 
Fund to cushion the effects of revenue volatility through smoothening of the 
budget and a Heritage Fund to ensure inter-generational equity and create 
an alternative source of income for future generations.20 
The enabling law: Issues and challenges 
The legal framework for Nigeria’s SWF is the Nigeria Sovereign Invest-ment Authority (Establishment, etc) Act No 15 of 2011.21 The NSIA 
Act was signed into law in May 2011 by former President Jonathan, after it 
17 J Akintunde, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds, IMF and Nigeria’s Excess Crude Account’ Finan-
cial Nigeria (Nigeria, 8 April 2008) <www.financialnigeria.com/development/developmen-
treport_category_item_detail.aspx?categoryid=3&item=90> accessed 17 June 2015. 
18 ibid.
19 See for example J Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (Bookcraft 2010) 14-7.
20 See Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 (Act 815), ss 2, 9 - 11; see also Open Oil 
‘Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 (14 February 2012). 
21 Cap N166 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004; [the NSIA Act].
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was passed by both Houses of the National Assembly. Nigeria and Angola 
are the latest members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) to establish a SWF.22
Governance issues
The NSIA Act establishes the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (the 
Authority) as a permanent corporation with legal capacity to sue and be 
sued in its name; and to be independent of the control of any person or 
authority in the management of the three funds established under the NSIA 
Act.23 The Authority is clothed with a wide range of investment powers 
within and outside Nigeria.24 The overall governance of the Authority is the 
joint responsibility of the Governing Council, the Board of Directors and 
the Executive Management. This gives the Authority the structure of both a 
public as well as a private corporation. 
While the Governing Council reflects the public character of the Au-
thority (State ownership), the Board of Directors and Executive Manage-
ment portray it as a business entity. The reasons for the structure may not 
be unconnected with the type and nature of the SWF – being an oil-based 
SWF, the State’s dominant position in the oil industry as well as the need 
for prudence in the management of funds set aside for the SWF may have 
influenced the structure of the Authority. And in order to give a sense of 
ownership to the constituent governments within the federation, and as-
suage their opposition to the establishment of the SWF, have been incorpo-
rated into the governance of the Authority. However, the local governments, 
which are also recognised as co-owners of the fund are not represented on 
the Governing Council.25 
While it is the duty of the Governing Council to provide advice and 
counsel of a general nature to the Board of Directors in relation to the ob-
jectives of the Authority,26 it is the responsibility of the Board to realize the 
objectives, make policies and supervise the management of the Authority’s 
22 cf A Monk ‘Nigeria should commit to commitment’ (Oxford SWF Project, University of 
Oxford, 2 July 2010).
23 NSIA Act, s 1(1) and (2). 
24 ibid s 5.
25 ibid s 29(b), cf s 8 which provides for the membership of the Governing Council to include: 
the president, state governors, the minister of finance, the minister of National Planning 
Commission, governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, chief economic adviser to the presi-
dent, chairman of the Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission, four per-
sons representing the private sector, two representatives of civil society organisations, two 
youth representatives and four academics.  
26 ibid s 7(2).
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affairs.27 The Board also has the power to appoint the secretary of the Au-
thority.28 It is made up of a non-executive chairman, a managing director, 
two executive directors and five non-executive directors (one of whom must 
be a legal practitioner with not less than 10 years post qualification expe-
rience), all of these appointments shall be made by the president of Nigeria 
on the recommendation of the NEC.29 The executive management, headed 
by the managing director/chief executive officer, has the responsibility of ex-
ecuting policies formulated by the Board and the day-to-day administration 
of the Authority.30 
In as much as the governance structure of the Authority exhibit po-
tentials for transparency and accountability, it appears to be unnecessarily 
ridden with bureaucratic huddles not befitting of a fund intended to be of 
international standard and to deliver efficient social services to the Nigerian 
people. It is believed that to have a Governing Council of the type estab-
lished by the NSIA Act with powers to advice and counsel the Board of 
Directors on general policy issues relating to the objects of the Authority is 
a recipe for political and overbearing influence on the smooth management 
of the affairs of the Authority. This remains to be seen as Nigeria’s SWF 
is rated 9 on the Linaburg-Maduel Transparency Index.31 At a glance, the 
law establishing the Authority and Nigeria’s SWF appears to be more busi-
ness-like with greater concern on return on investments and less on meeting 
the deficit social needs.
Ownership and funding
As the name implies, Nigeria’s SWF is a national fund. Therefore all owner-
ship interests in the Funds established under the SWF is to be held by all tiers 
of government, including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, in 
trust for the people of Nigeria.32 No government in the federation is allowed 
to ‘transfer, redeem, assign, dispose of, sell, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise 
encumber any interest of any kind in the Authority.’33 This implies that no 
tier of government is allowed to borrow against the assets of the SWF.
27 ibid s 15.
28 ibid s 22.
29 ibid s 16(1) and (2).
30 ibid s 21(b).
31 Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority ‘NSIA rated Transparent by Sovereign wealth insti-
tute’  (16 July 2014); SWF Institute ‘Nigeria sovereign wealth investment authority’ <www.
swfinstitute.org/swfs/excess-crude-account/> accessed 17 August 2014.
32 NSIA Act, s 32(2).
33 ibid s 32(3). 
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As a result of the foregoing, the initial funding for the national SWF was 
deemed to have been contributed by the federal, state and local governments as 
well as the FCT in consonance with the existing revenue allocation formula pur-
suant to the decision reached by the NEC to be managed by the Authority. In 
2011, the amount designated as seed money was USD 1 billion. Another USD 550 
million was transferred by the federal government to the Authority in 2014. And 
subsequent funding is to be derived from the federation account. By the provisions 
of the NSIA Act, each of the tiers of government including the FCT will contribute 
to the Authority in accordance with their percentage share from the federation 
account – as provided in the Allocation of Revenue (Federation Account, etc) Act 
– on a monthly basis. Section 30 of the NSIA Act provides that: 
(1) Subsequent funding shall be derived from residual funds from the 
federation account transferred to the Authority … provided that 
derivation portion of the revenue allocation formula shall not be 
included as part of this funding.
(2) Promptly upon revenues being received into the federation account 
each month, the Authority shall be funded from all amounts of 
residual funds above the budgetary smoothing amount.
Since the enactment of the NSIA Act, which established Nigeria’s SWF, 
the ownership and funding provisions of the Act have caused disagreements 
between the federal and state governments. These disagreements are based 
on constitutional issues, which shall be examined in section 3 of this paper. 
Policy objectives and implementation
The objects of the Authority are to build a savings base for the Nigerian people, to enhance the development of infrastructure and to provide 
budgetary stabilization during times of economic down turn.34 The provi-
sions of the law establishing the SWF structure it structured both as a fund 
and a corporation.35 Consequently, the NSIA Act creates three investment ve-
hicles namely: the Future Generations Fund (FGF), the Nigeria Infrastructure 
Fund (NIF) and the Stabilization Fund. The initial and subsequent funding 
of the Authority shall be allocated to each of the three funds by resolution of 
34 ibid s 3.
35 ibid ss 1, 29 and 30; pts IV, V and VI.  
36 ibid s 31.
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the Board of Directors in accordance with the provision of the NSIA Act.36 
The Authority is required to develop a rolling five-year investment plan 
for the FGF annually. This is aimed at providing future generations with a 
solid savings base in preparation for such a time when Nigeria’s oil reserves 
may have been exhausted and with due regard to macroeconomic factors.37 
The Authority is empowered to reinvest all realized proceeds and dividends 
on portfolio investments of the fund into new or existing assets. The NIF is 
aimed at investing specifically in the development of critical infrastructure 
such as power generation, distribution and transmission, agriculture, dams, 
water and sewage treatment and delivery, roads, port, rail, airport facilities 
and similar assets in order to stimulate the growth and diversification of the 
Nigerian economy and create jobs for the Nigerian people.38 The Authority 
is empowered to reinvest the funds of the NIF pending investments in in-
frastructure. The Stabilization Fund is established to promote a sound and 
responsible fiscal policy, while reducing the effects of the ‘boom and bust’ 
commodity cycle of oil on the Nigerian economy. The Stabilization Fund 
is intended to avail government access to funds to apply in stabilizing the 
revenue streams of the federation.39 The Authority may invest in or sell all 
such assets, and use such derivative instruments for the purposes of hedging 
or efficient asset management, as may serve such objective of the fund.40 
3. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NIGERIA’S  
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND 
The decision to establish a national SWF is by far one of the most (if not the most) significant decisions taken by the Nigerian government 
in a long time. Albeit, the controversy surrounding the decision has again 
thrown up issues bordering on the vertical separation of powers and func-
tions between the various tiers of government in Nigeria. These issues are, 
indeed, constitutional in nature. Therefore, this section examines Nigeria’s 
SWF in relation to the 1999 Constitution.
There are fundamental issues relating to the process leading to the es-
tablishment of a national SWF and what it portends for the constituent units 
of the Nigerian State. Hence, it is imperative to pose the following ques-
tions: Was the process that led to the establishment of the SWF democratic 
37 ibid s 39(1).
38 ibid s 41(1).
39 ibid s 47.
40 ibid s 47(1).
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to the extent that all the tiers of government were on board during the 
decision-making process? Is the end product (the SWF) of the process con-
stitutional? As to the first question, it appears to be a straightforward one 
as it is evident that all three tiers of government in Nigeria did not go with 
the idea to establish a national SWF. Neither did each tier of government 
given the opportunity to choose its preferred type of SWF, as is the case 
in other jurisdictions such as the states of Texas and Alaska in the United 
States (US) where their SWFs are creations of the express provisions of their 
constitutions. 
In Alabama its SWF was established after a public referendum, and the 
decision for a SWF for North Dakota was approved in a statewide ballot 
(see section 4). Despite failing to carry the other two tiers of government 
along in the establishment of the national SWF, the NSIA Act refers to all 
tiers of government as co-owners and funders of the SWF.41 More so, the 
state governments who are represented on the NEC (a federal executive 
body that approved the establishment of an SWF) by the governors do not 
support, at least in principle, the SWF. This is basically because of the con-
cerns that the monthly mandatory ‘deductions’ to be made from the states’ 
and local governments’ allocations will reduce their revenue profile, which 
is mainly accruable from the federation account. 
The second question which involves the constitutional issue that has 
come up because of the establishment of a national SWF by the federal gov-
ernment borders on section 162 of the 1999 Constitution which provides in 
subsections 1 and 3 thus: 
(1) The [f]ederation shall maintain a special account to be called ‘the 
federation account’ into which shall be paid all revenues collected by 
the [g]overnment of the [f]ederation, except the proceeds from the 
personal income tax of personnel of the armed forces of the [f]eder-
ation, the Nigeria Police Force, the ministry or department charged 
with responsibility for the foreign affairs and the residents of the 
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
(3) Any amount standing to the credit of the federation account shall 
be distributed among the federal and state governments and the 
local government councils in each state on such terms and in such 
manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.
41 See ownership and funding of Nigeria’s SWF above.
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This has generated a debate as to the intendment of the above constitu-
tional provisions vis-à-vis Nigeria’s SWF. In this section, the arguments for 
and against the national SWF are examined and the constitutional justifica-
tion for its establishment is also made.
Sovereign wealth fund: The Constitutional  
permissibility argument 
One legal writer, a proponent of the national SWF, has argued that since the Constitution is silent on the issue of a dedicated Fund such as the 
SWF, any attempt to facilitate the realization of the broader intendment of 
the Constitution is permissible. Accordingly he queries as follows:
Does the Constitution expressly prohibit the existence of a [F]und, a 
subsidiary account, however called, administered and distributed among 
the three-tiers of government as envisaged per sections 80(2) & (3), as well 
as 162(3)? The better view is that the Constitution is silent on prohibition 
by not prescribing one and only one account. Where a provision is silent 
on a specific issue, any act not likely to defeat the broader objective of the 
provision but rather help to facilitate its fuller realization is permissible. 
The broad objective of Section 162 of the Constitution is the ownership, 
management and distribution of national revenue to the three tiers of gov-
ernment.42
The present writer agrees with the above submission only to the extent 
that where a provision of the Constitution is silent on a specific issue, any 
act likely to promote the broader objective of the Constitution is permis-
sible. However, to a large extent, the argument made by Odiadi is flawed. 
First of all, section 80 of the 1999 Constitution provides for a consolidated 
revenue fund, a federal government account into which all federal revenues 
or moneys are to be paid and appropriated in accordance with an Act of the 
National Assembly. In the same way, section 120 of the 1999 Constitution 
provides for a consolidated revenue fund for states of the federation into 
which all revenues or moneys raised or received by a state are to be paid and 
appropriated in accordance with a law of the state House of Assembly. It is 
therefore argued that sections 80 and 120 of the 1999 Constitution envisage 
or contemplate the establishment of a dedicated fund such as the SWF by 
the federal and or state governments, which should be funded from its/their 
own revenues or moneys. 
42 T Odiadi, ‘The constitution and sovereign wealth fund: Matters arising’ The Guardian 
(Lagos, 7 August 2012).
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Secondly, in section 162(3), specific mention of the beneficiaries (fed-
eral, state and local government councils) of the amounts standing to the 
credit of the federation account is made. It is pertinent to note at this point, 
that in the construction of a statutory provision, where a statute mentions 
specific things or persons, it is intended that those things or persons not 
mentioned are excluded. The Latin maxim is expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). Converse-
ly, it is also termed inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.43 Accordingly, the 
purpose of section 162 is to establish a trusteeship of some sort in which 
the federal government collects revenues on behalf of all the governments 
of the federation.44 Therefore, a conjunctive reading of sections 80, 120 and 
162(3) of the Constitution provides a broad objective,45 which is founded 
on a shared responsibility principle of federalism.46 Moreover, it has been 
variously held by the Supreme Court of Nigeria that where words used in a 
statute are clear and unambiguous their ordinary, literal and natural mean-
ing should prevail.47 
Sovereign wealth fund and the federalism argument
For some who oppose the policy and law establishing a national SWF for Nigeria, they have argued that it offends the principles of federalism 
and that since only the federal government is responsible for determining 
what will constitute budgetary price of crude oil in any fiscal year, the ex-
cess moneys from the sale of crude oil is determinable only by the federal 
government. For others, the SWF is a violation of the principle embedded 
in section 162(3) of the Constitution. According to Ojameruaye, Nigeria’s 
SWF, like the ECA, offends section 162(3) of the 1999 Constitution, ‘[b]y 
not sharing all the excess oil revenue among the three tiers of government, 
at least instantaneously, the excess oil revenue is akin to a withdrawal or 
a first-line charge on the [f]ederation [a]ccount which the Supreme Court 
43 See BA Garner (ed) ‘Legal Maxims’ Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edn, St Paul: Thomson 
West, 2004) 1717; see also the cases of Ogbuanyinya & 5 ors v Okudo & 2 ors [1979] 
ANLR 105; Udoh & 2 ors v. Orthopaedic Hospital Management Board & Anor [1993] 7 
NWLR (pt 304) 139, 148.
44 A-G Federation v A-G Abia State (No 2) [2002] All NLR 72.
45 Awolowo v Sarki [1966] 1 All NLR 178 (SC); Olanrewaju v Governor of Oyo State & ors 
[1992] 9 NWLR (pt 265) 335, 362 ‘[i]n construing the provisions of a statute it is import-
ant to have in mind the clearly defined objectives of such a statute’ (Karibi-Whyte JSC). 
46 Attorney-General of Bendel State v Attorney-General of the Federation & 22 ors [1981] 
ANLR 85.
47 Abioye v Yakubu [1991] 5 NWLR (pt 190) 130, 146; Amokeodo v IGP & ors [1999] 6 
NWLR (pt 607) 467, 488.
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declared unconstitutional in its 2002 judgment on the offshore/onshore oil 
dichotomy case’.48 
In as much as it is not difficult to agree with the above position from 
the viewpoint of section 162(3) of the 1999 Constitution, it is important 
to note that the Supreme Court of Nigeria has set the legal precedent for 
the application of practicality in the interpretation of the Constitution. In 
Adesanya v President of the Federal Republic, the Court held that when 
interpreting the Constitution, the courts should look at the Constitution as 
a whole and ‘construe its provisions in such a way as to justify the hopes 
and aspirations of those who have made the strenuous effort to provide us 
with a Constitution for the purpose of promoting the good government and 
welfare of all persons of our country on the principles of freedom, equality 
and justice...’.49 Also, in the case of Awolowo v Sarki, the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria held that a provision in a constitution cannot be read in isolation 
when such provision is qualified by some other consideration.50 In the pres-
ent situation, it may be argued that the holistic interpretation of the 1999 
Constitution in respect of the establishment of an SWF may be derived from 
the provisions of section 16 and item 60(a) of the second schedule to the Ex-
clusive Legislative list of the 1999 Constitution. Above all, the consideration 
for establishing a national SWF may be based on the need to promote good 
governance and the welfare of the citizens by salvaging the socio-economic 
crisis in Nigeria. 
Constitutional doctrines and constitutional  
validity of Nigeria’s SWF
Having considered, in brief, the constitutional arguments for and against the establishment of a national SWF, it is pertinent to examine the 
SWF policy and law using two constitutional doctrines which determine the 
validity or otherwise of the acts of governments in a federal system. These 
are the doctrines of ultra vires and mutual non-interference. It has been sug-
gested that, in a federal system, it is hasty and simplistic to concede to either 
side of the debate that is examined in this section (ie the constitutionality of 
a national SWF), without first considering whether the governmental action 
48 E Ojameruaye ‘Resolving the Nigeria sovereign wealth fund debacle’ (31 May 2012) 
<http://chatafrik.com/articles/nigerian-affairs/item/963-resolving-the-nigeria-sover-
eign-wealth-fund-debacle.html> accessed 10 August 2012. The decision referred to was 
given in the case of A-G Federation v A-G Abia State  (n 44).
49 [1981] ANLR 1, 25 (Fatai-Williams CJN).
50 [1966] 1 All NLR 178.
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in issue passes the ultra vires and mutual non-interference tests. According 
to Nwabueze, it is important to ascertain: 
[F]irst whether the act is within powers granted by the constitution; 
if it is not, then, it is unconstitutional and void as being ultra vires; 
second, whether the exercise of the power is such as, in its practical 
effect, impedes, frustrate, stultifies or otherwise unduly interferes 
with another government’s management of its affairs. In the latter 
case, the act is unconstitutional and void, not because it is ultra 
vires, but because the frustration or stultification of, or interference 
with, another government’s management of its affairs would result 
in the federal system itself being abolished in all but name.51
Therefore, in order to determine whether the establishment of a nation-
al SWF by the federal government of Nigeria is constitutional, the questions 
to ask are: Does the Constitution grant the federal government the power 
to establish a national SWF? Will the exercise of such power by the federal 
government have a negative effect, impede and interfere with the manage-
ment of the affairs of the constituent governments of the federation?
It would appear that the opponents of the national SWF have confused 
the powers of the National Assembly to make laws for the country on mat-
ters contained in the Exclusive Legislative List with the powers to fund a 
national agency or programme with the funds meant for the three tiers of 
government which is dealt with in section 162(3) of the 1999 Constitution. 
It is important to make a distinction between the powers to establish an 
SWF and the powers to fund it from the federation account. This is because 
there is a clear distinction between the powers of the federal government, 
through the National Assembly, to establish a national SWF and the funding 
of the SWF as contained in section 30 of the NSIA Act. In situations that 
involve acts such as the former, the federal government did not act (and will 
not be acting) ultra vires the Constitution. However, this cannot be said to 
be the case in the latter situation (and will not be), by funding the national 
SWF from the federation account, as was decided by the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria on the issue of funding the Joint Venture Contracts and the NNPC 
51 B Nwabueze, Constitutional Democracy in Africa: Structures, Powers and Organising 
Principles of Government (1st edn, Spectrum Books 2003) 94.
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priority projects from funds meant for the three tiers of government.52 With 
this distinction made and bearing in mind the constitutional permissibility 
argument as discussed in section 3.1 above, the answer to the first question 
is in the affirmative to the extent that the establishment of the national SWF 
is permissible under the Constitution.
It is important to note that the essence of the federal system as enshrined 
in the 1999 Constitution is not only to distribute government powers and 
functions among the various governmental centres but also to preclude the 
exercise of arbitrary power.53 This is a testament to the fact that there is 
bound to be frictions among the various governmental units in the course 
of the operation of a federal constitution. However, it is expected that the 
tenets of the constitution should always prevail. 
For example, in 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(Obama Care) generated so much political friction in the US between the fed-
eral government and many state governments on the one hand and the Obama 
administration and the opposition Republican Party on the other hand, after 
Congress, with a slim Democratic Party majority, passed the Obama Care to 
increase the number of Americans to be covered by health insurance. (This 
was an executive bill sponsored by the Obama administration). One key pro-
vision of the law is the individual mandate, which requires most Americans to 
maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage. For individuals who 
are not exempt, and who do not receive health insurance through an employ-
er or government programme, the means of satisfying the requirement is to 
purchase insurance from a private company. The law provides that beginning 
in 2014, those who do not comply with the mandate must make a shared 
responsibility payment to the federal government. Another key provision of 
the law is the Medicaid expansion. The previous Medicaid programme of-
fered federal funding to the states to assist pregnant women, children, needy 
families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled in obtaining medical care. The 
52 A-G Federation v A-G Abia State (n 44) 130 (Ogundare JSC) (emphasis added): ‘I have 
discussed earlier in this judgment the question of repayment of the debts of the [g]overn-
ment of the [f]ederation; the repayment is to be charged not on the federation account, but 
on the revenue and assets of the [g]overnment of the [f]ederation. I have also discussed the 
constitutional validity of section 1(d)(i) of Cap 16 (as amended) [a legislation authorising 
the deduction of moneys from the federation account for sundry matters] and found it to 
be inconsistent with section 162(3) of the Constitution. Funding of Joint Venture Contracts 
and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) priority projects cannot by any 
stretch of construction, come within section 162(3) of the Constitution which provides 
for the distribution of the federation account among the three tiers of government that is 
federal, states and local governments. All these charges on the federation account are incon-
sistent with the Constitution and are, therefore, invalid [and unconstitutional]’.
53 Myers v United States [1926] 272 US 52, 293.
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Act expands the scope of the Medicaid programme and increases the number 
of individuals the states must cover. Consequently, the core principles of the 
legislation were challenged up to the US Supreme Court by 26 states. The 
following questions were presented for determination: 
1. Does Congress exceed its enumerated powers and violate basic 
principles of federalism when it coerces States into accepting oner-
ous conditions that it could not impose directly by threatening to 
withhold all federal funding under the single largest grant-in-aid 
program, or does the limitation on Congress’s spending power 
that this Court recognized in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 
(1987), no longer apply?
2. May Congress treat states no differently from any other employer 
when imposing invasive mandates as to the manner in which they 
provide their own employees with insurance coverage, as suggested 
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 
528 (1985), or has Garcia’s approach been overtaken by subsequent 
cases in which this Court has explicitly recognized judicially enforce-
able limits on Congress’s power to interfere with state sovereignty?
3. Does the Affordable Care Act’s mandate that virtually every indi-
vidual obtain health insurance exceed Congress’s enumerated pow-
ers and, if so, to what extent (if any) can the mandate be severed 
from the remainder of the Act?54
In essence, the case was a challenge to the constitutionality of the individu-
al mandate and the insurance provisions, the Medicaid expansion and the em-
ployer mandates provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
In its judgment, the US Supreme Court held that ‘[t]he language of the 
Constitution reflects the natural understanding that the power to regulate 
assumes there is already something to be regulated. “[T]he enlightened pa-
triots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must 
be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have 
intended what they have said.”55 Therefore the Court struck down the in-
54 Florida & ors v United States Department of Health and Human Services & ors, consoli-
dated into National Federation of Independent Business and other v Sebelius, Secretary of 
Health and others Human Services & ors [2012] 567 (US).
55 National Federation of Independent Business and other (n 54) (Roberts CJ).
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dividual mandate and the Medicaid expansion and upheld other provisions 
of the Act by deciding that the Affordable Care Act is constitutional in part 
and unconstitutional in part because, as it construed, what Congress did 
was to increase taxes on those who earned a certain amount of income, 
but elected to go without health insurance. For the Court, such legislation 
is within Congress’ power to tax. However, as for the Medicaid expansion, 
the Court decided that ‘that portion of the Affordable Care Act violates the 
Constitution by threatening existing Medicaid funding. [Therefore] Con-
gress has no authority to order the states to regulate according to its in-
structions. [However] Congress may offer the states grants and require the 
states to comply with accompanying conditions, but the states must have 
a genuine choice whether to accept the offer. The states are given no such 
choice in this case’.56
As for the second question – whether the establishment of a national 
SWF will have a negative effect, impede and interfere with the management 
of the affairs of state governments, it may be argued that this is very unlikely. 
This is because the SWF is to be funded by residual funds from the federation 
account, being amount above the budgetary benchmark from the monthly 
sale of crude oil.57 This means that the SWF is effectively to be funded from 
excess budgetary amount. Also, section 30(1) of the NSIA Act significantly 
reduces the financial contributions to be made by the states and local govern-
ments as derivation revenues are not to be charged for the purpose of funding 
of the SWF. Furthermore, the mandatory contributions to be made by all tiers 
of government may just be the needed impetus to introduce some measure of 
financial discipline in resource allocation in states where financial wastage 
(which in many instances give rise to corrupt enrichment of public officials) is 
prone. As a purposeful and prudently managed SWF has the potential to im-
prove the management of the country’s resources in the long run, while also 
enhancing the socio-economic outlook of the country as will be shown in sec-
tion 4 (which undertakes a comparative evaluation of sovereign wealth fund). 
It should be pointed out, at this point, that only few states of the federation 
have enacted the equivalent of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which could em-
bolden citizens to hold governments at the state and local government levels 
to account for the allocation and appropriation of financial resources.58 
56 ibid 58-9 (emphasis added).
57 NSIA Act, s 30(2).
58 In Nkereuwem Udofia Akpan v Executive Governor of Abia State & 38 ors (Suit No: FHC/
ABJ/CS/753/2010), counsel to the Governor of Akwa Ibom State used this lacuna in the law 
in his defence to the suit brought by Nkereuwem Akpan against the 36 state governors on 
the issue of security votes. 
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4. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND
At present, there are about 62 SWFs in 36 countries of the world. They cut across different political orientations/cultures – strong democra-
cies, factional democracies, paternalistic autocracies, predatory autocracies 
and reformist autocracies.59 This section examines SWF from a comparative 
viewpoint. The essence is to identify the law and practice of SWF in the se-
lected jurisdictions. The choice of the four jurisdictions – Australia, Canada, 
Russia, and the US, is informed by the similarity in the federal governmental 
systems of these countries. It is believed that the selection of these juris-
dictions will help show that with the efficient application of the SWF, the 
Nigerian State can promote good governance through accountability and 
transparent management of a sizeable portion of its oil revenues and attain 
to the welfare needs of its citizens by salvaging the dwindled socio-economic 
infrastructures in Nigeria.  
The law and practice in the United States 
In the US there is no national SWF. However, each state is at liberty to es-tablish its own SWF. For the purpose of the present discourse, only SWFs 
funded by oil and gas proceeds will be examined. 
Texas permanent school fund 
The Texas Permanent School Fund is the oldest SWF in the US. A legislative 
body created it in 1854. It was initially funded by an appropriation of USD 
2 million and was for the benefit of public schools in state of Texas. The 
relinquishing of its claims to lands and the payment of USD 10 million by 
the US government resulted in the establishment of the fund. Key sources 
of funding for the SWF are its investment returns, oil and gas and mineral 
royalty payments and leases from land. According to the Constitution of the 
state of Texas, the fund is permanent and perpetual. The constitution also 
provides that the proceeds are to be used to complement taxes in financing 
public education. Also, the fund’s assets are held in a trustee capacity for 
the benefit of public schools and distributed annually using a total return 
59 KU Ekwere, ‘Sustainable development of oil and gas in the Niger Delta: Legal and political 
issues’ (PhD dissertation, the Law of  the Sea and Maritime Law Institute, University of 
Hamburg 2009) 154-7.
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methodology. The fund’s financial assets are managed by the state Board of 
Education (SBOE), comprised of fifteen elected members. Administrative 
duties related to these assets reside with the fund’s Investment Office, a divi-
sion of the Texas Education Agency (TEA), which is under the guidance of 
the commissioner of education, an appointee of the governor of the state.60 
Alabama trust fund
In 1986, the Alabama Trust Fund (ATF) was established by the state of Ala-
bama following a public referendum in 1985. Initially a permanent fund, it 
is now a special revenue fund, which allows for the spending of an amount 
equal to the previous year’s unrealized gains. The funding of the ATF is 
derived from royalty from oil and gas firms. In fact, 99 per cent of royalty 
payments is allocated to the ATF and the remaining one per cent goes to 
the Department of Conservation Land Division of the state of Alabama. 
External managers chosen by the Board of Trustees manage the ATF. In 
2008, some legislators pushed for an amendment in the law to allow the 
government to tap from the trust fund savings to build roads, rescue pre-
paid tuition plan and to plug budget holes. However, the money so used is 
repaid to the fund in future years.61 The Alabama Trust Fund is rated 6 on 
the Linaburg-Maduel Transparency Index.62
Alaska permanent fund
Shortly after the oil from Alaska’s North Slope entered the market, the 
Alaska Permanent Fund was established by the Constitution of the state of 
Alaska in 197663 (the creation was made possible by an amendment to the 
60 SWF Institute ‘Texas permanent school fund’ <www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/texas-perma-
nent-school-fund/> accessed 12 August 2012.
61 SWF Institute ‘Alabama trust fund’ < www.swfinstitute.org/fund/alabama.php> accessed 
12 August 2012.
62 According to the SWF Institute, the ‘Linaburg-Maduel transparency index was developed 
at the Sovereign wealth fund institute by Carl Linaburg and Michael Maduell. The Linab-
urg-Maduell transparency index is a method of rating transparency in respect to sovereign 
wealth funds. Pertaining to government-owned investment vehicles, where there have been 
concerns of unethical agendas, calls have been made to the larger ‘opaque’ or non-transpar-
ent funds to show their intentions. This index is based off ten essential principles that depict 
sovereign wealth fund transparency to the public. … The index is an ongoing project of the 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. The minimum rating a fund can receive is a 1. However, 
the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute recommends a minimum rating of 8 in order to claim 
adequate transparency. Transparency ratings may change as funds release additional informa-
tion. There are different levels of depth in regards to each principle, judgment of these prin-
ciples is left to the discretion of the sovereign wealth fund institute.’ See <www.swfinstitute.
org/statistics-research/linaburg-maduell-transparency-index/> accessed 4 February 2015. 
63 art 9, s 15.
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constitution which hitherto forbade the establishment of a dedicated fund; 
it provides for an investment of at least 25 percent of proceeds from oil 
and gas sale or royalties). The Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC) 
manages the assets of both the Permanent Fund and other state investments, 
but spending from the fund is determined by the state legislature. The cor-
poration is responsible for maximum prudent returns, a measure basically 
expected to take away direct political control of oil revenue – many Alas-
kans believe the legislature too quickly and too inefficiently spent the USD 
900 million bonus the state received in 1969 after leasing out the oil fields. 
The fund’s assets grew from an initial investment of USD 734 thousand 
in 1977 to the current sum of approximately USD 40.3 billion as of July 
2012. This growth has been due to good and efficient management, some 
to inflationary re-investment, and others due to legislative decisions to de-
posit extra income during boom years. The fund’s realized earnings are split 
between operating expenses, alternative investments, and the annual Per-
manent Fund Dividend. It is rated 10 out of 10 on the Linaburg-Maduel 
Transparency Index.
The fund has a Board of six trustee members (responsible for policy) of 
the APFC. The governor of the state of Alaska appoints them. Alaska law 
provides that the APFC Board be comprised of four public members, the 
commissioner of revenue and one additional cabinet member of the gover-
nor’s choosing. Public members serve staggered four-year term. Most im-
portantly, the Board is responsible for the review, adoption and monitoring 
of asset allocation that achieves a five percent real (above inflation) rate of 
return in accordance with the Prudent Expert Rule. The Prudent Expert Rule 
charges fiduciaries to act with discretion and intelligence, to seek reasonable 
income, preserve capital, and, in general, avoid speculative investments. To 
reduce risk exposure, APFC diversifies assets as well as management style.64
Since 1982 every person who has been a resident of Alaska for the 
previous year and indicates an intention to remain gets a Permanent Fund 
Dividend (PFD) cheque from the state government. Everyone receives an 
equal share of the appropriation from the earnings of the Alaska Permanent 
Fund with parents responsible for the cheques of their children.65 In 2000, 
the government distributed USD 1.172 billion in cheques of USD 1,963 
64 SWF Institute, ‘Alaska permanent fund corporation’ <www.swfinstitute.org/fund/alaska.
php> accessed 18 June 2014.
65 S Goldsmith ‘The Alaska permanent fund dividend program’ (paper presented at the con-
ference on Alberta: Government Policies in a Surplus Economy, University of Alberta, Ed-
monton, Alberta, 7 September 2001) 1. 
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to 597,000 Alaskans, which means that 95 per cent of the 627 thousand 
Alaskans shared in the distribution of the dividend. The fund paid out USD 
1,281 to 611,522 residents, totaling USD 783.4 million in 2010 (the 2010 
US Census put Alaska’s population at 710,231) and in 2011 it paid out 
about USD 760.2 million in cheques of USD 1,174 to 647,549 Alaskan res-
idents who were deemed eligible to receive dividends.66 At inception, many 
politicians argued against this way of spending the oil revenue, however, the 
following argument for the dividend scheme as highlighted by Goldsmith 
prevailed:
It is the most equitable way to distribute the benefits from oil develop-
ment. Billions have been spent operating state government, building infra-
structure, loaning money for housing, education, and business development, 
and other purposes. The economic benefits of all these programs [,] impact 
only a portion of the population. It creates a constituency to protect the 
Permanent Fund from raids on its principal. It compensates Alaskans for 
the high cost of living and the economic hardships residents endured before 
the discovery of oil. It produces a larger economic impact, measured by 
jobs, than any other use of the earnings. Individuals know better than the 
government how to use that money. State ownership of the oil fields means 
that the people own the resource and the revenues from its sale should be 
distributed to the owners as a dividend.67
North Dakota legacy fund 
The voters of North Dakota approved of the Legacy Fund idea in a state-
wide ballot held on 2 November 2010. A total of 63.6 per cent voted in 
favour of the North Dakota State Legacy Fund Establishment, Measure 1 
of 201068 to approve a constitutional amendment which provides that 30 
per cent of oil and gas gross production and oil extraction taxes on oil and 
gas produced after 30 June 2011, be transferred to the Legacy Fund. The 
principal and earnings of the Legacy Fund may not be spent until after 30 
June 2017, and any expenditure of principal after that date requires a vote 
of at least two-thirds of the members elected to each house of the legislative 
assembly. The state’s Investment Board is responsible for investment of the 
principal funds of the Legacy Fund.69 The first deposit into the fund was 
66 B Bohrer ‘Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend: $1,174’ (20 September 2011).
67 Goldsmith (n 65) 2.
68 See <http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/North_Dakota_State_Legacy_Fund_Establish-
ment,_Measure_1_ (2010)> accessed 14 June 2014. 
69 Constitution of North Dakota, art X, s 26. 
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USD 34.3 million. As a policy measure, ‘the Legacy Fund was created, in 
part, due to the recognition that state revenue from the oil and gas industry 
will be derived over a finite timeframe. The Legacy Fund defers the recogni-
tion of 30 per cent of this revenue for the benefit of future generations. The 
primary mission of the Legacy Fund is to preserve the real, inflation-adjust-
ed purchasing power of the monies deposited into the [f]und.’70
Approach to sovereign wealth fund in Canada 
As is the case in the US, there is no national SWF in Canada. However, Alberta Province has the Alberta Heritage Fund (an oil-based SWF) 
while Quebec Province has the Caisse de Depot Placement du Quebec (a 
non-commodity SWF). For the purpose of this discourse, only the Alberta 
Heritage Fund will be examined.
Alberta heritage fund 
The Alberta Heritage Fund was enacted under the Alberta Heritage Savings 
Trust Fund Act of 1976. Initially the fund received 30 per cent of the roy-
alties from non-renewable resource of the province of Alberta. After 1987, 
resource royalty revenues were no longer added to the Fund. Originally, the 
Heritage Fund had three objectives, which were designed for the purpose of 
economic development – to save for the future generation, to strengthen or 
diversify the economy, and to improve the quality of life of Albertans. How-
ever, in 1997, the Heritage Fund was restructured so that the government 
could no longer directly use funds from it to invest in economic and social 
development, but primarily for long-term savings and investment fund.
During the early 1980s, the fund made loans to other provincial govern-
ments in Canada. Later the fund’s money was used for capital infrastructure 
projects. Currently it is being managed by the Alberta Investment Manage-
ment Company (AIMC), which was established in 2008. The AIMC was 
formerly part of the Ministry of Finance of Alberta before transforming 
into a provincial crown corporation, providing investment management to 
a variety of public sector institutions.71 The fund is rated 9 on the Linab-
urg-Maduel Transparency Index. According to the Alberta Treasury Board 
and Finance, since the establishment of the AIMC, ‘the fund has generated 
70 North Dakota Legacy Fund Investment Policy Statement <www.legis.nd.gov/assem-
bly/622011/docs/ pdf/lbs090611appendixc.pdf> accessed 19 June 2014.
71 SWF Institute ‘Alberta heritage fund’ <www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/alberta-heritage-fund/> 
accessed 14 June 2014.
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more than USD 34 billion in investment income that has improved the qual-
ity of life in the province.’72 
Australia’s future fund
The SWF of Australia, established by the Future Fund Act of 2006, is a pension reserve fund known as the Australian Future Fund, into which 
the government deposits its budget surpluses. It is independently managed, 
free from executive influence, by the Board of Guardians. The purpose of 
the fund is to hold yearly budgetary surplus for the payments of pensions.73 
Chile’s Pension Reserve Fund, Ireland’s National Pensions Reserve Fund, 
New Zealand’s Superannuation Fund, and the Russian Federation’s Nation-
al Welfare Fund are based on the same principle. In 2008, the Australian 
government announced its intention to establish three new funds to be tied 
to the management of the Future Fund (the Building Australia Fund, the 
Education Investment Fund and the Health and Hospitals Fund).74 The Na-
tion-building Funds Act of 2008 subsequently established these funds.75
The roles and responsibilities of the Future Fund Board of Guardians 
(the Board) are set out in the enabling legislation. The Board is collective-
ly responsible for the investment decisions relating to the special purpose 
public funds and is accountable to the government for the safekeeping and 
performance of those assets. As such, the Board’s primary role is to set the 
strategic direction of the investment activities of the fund in line with the 
investment mandates. The Board is supported in its functions by the Future 
Fund Management Agency. The Agency is responsible for the development 
of recommendations to the Board on the most appropriate investment strat-
egy for each fund and for the implementation of strategies. All administra-
tive and operational functions associated with the management of the funds 
are undertaken by the Agency.76 The Future Fund is listed on the highest 
scale of 10 on the Linaburg-Maduel Transparency Index.
72 Alberta Treasury Board and Finance ‘Heritage fund: Historical timeline’ (28 June 2012). 
73 SWF Institute ‘Future fund’ <www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/future-fund/> accessed 13 July 
2014.
74 W Swan, 2008-09 Budget Speech (Parliament House, Canberra, 13 May 2008). 
75 Future Fund ‘Facts at a glance’ (3 February 2012) <www.futurefund.gov.au/> accessed 18 
August 2012. 
76 Future Fund, ‘Future fund board of guardians’ (2 April 2012) <www.futurefund.gov.au/
about_the_future_fund/future_fund_board_of_guardians > accessed 18 August 2014.
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Russia’s national welfare fund
The National Welfare Fund (NWF) is also known as the National Pros-perity Fund or the National Well-being Fund. Prior to the establishment 
of the NWF, there was the official stabilisation fund known as the Reserve 
Fund, set up in 2004. Its main purpose was to stimulate economic develop-
ment by means of reducing inflationary pressure and insulating the national 
economy from volatility in the prices of non-renewable resources. In 2008, 
the fund was split in two; one managing the official government reserves 
and the other became the SWF. The main purpose for its establishment is to 
guarantee the long-term sustainability of the pensions system and payment 
of pension to citizens, as well as to balance the budget of the Pension Fund of 
the Russian federation.77 The fund is mostly managed by the Russian Minis-
try of Finance and is rated 5 on the transparency index of the SWF Institute.
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The emphasis placed on the sharing of proceeds of oil wealth rather than on fashioning an effective production system in Nigeria has attracted 
criticisms from within and outside the country. The rationale for the estab-
lishment of SWF is predicated on the premise that oil is a non-renewable 
resource – an imperative for SWF, which will ensure that excess revenues 
from oil are invested in socio-economic infrastructures for the benefit of the 
present and future generations. From the literature, it has been shown that 
SWFs state objectives in financial terms by hoping for strong investment 
performance. Most SWFs are long-term oriented and are mainly concerned 
with investment safety. This means that SWFs are expected to outperform 
certain benchmark portfolios in terms of the overall relationship between 
risk and returns. However, it is important for a SWF to be concerned with 
the impacts of its activities and performance on the country of origin. Some 
of the benefits that flow from such activities and performance include the 
creation of wealth for future generations; stability of the domestic econ-
omy, the ability to fund projects at home and earn returns beyond those 
traditionally earned on foreign currency reserves (for example, investments 
in education, health and other socio-economic infrastructures with direct 
relationship with citizens welfare). In addition, an SWF is one means of 
diversifying the economy of the country of origin. 
77 Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation ‘National welfare fund: Mission’ <www1.
minfin.ru/en/nationalwealthfund/mission/> accessed 17 August 2012.
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It has been argued in this paper that while the power to establish a na-
tional SWF is not an express provision of Nigeria’s constitutional text, the es-
tablishment of the SWF by the federal government is not unconstitutional and 
will not stultify the management of the affairs of the constituent governments. 
Most importantly, a SWF will encourage the effective and prudent manage-
ment of oil revenues. And besides the point that Nigeria is long overdue for 
an infrastructural investment vehicle such as the SWF, the need to invest in the 
socio-economic sectors of the economy has attained a critical priority level. 
And the choice made to address the situation as embodied in the enactment 
of the NSIA Act, which establishes the SWF is a demonstration of the belief 
in the linkage between human needs, socio-economic policies and law.78 The 
enactment of the NSIA Act, which establishes the SWF, understandably, gen-
erated a legal debate basically because of the source of funding the SWF. This 
aspect of the NSIA Act has been identified in this paper as unconstitutional. 
However, this problem is solvable through constitutional amendment and it 
is here recommended in order to enable the SWF to be applied as a policy 
tool to reduce the socio-economic vulnerability in Nigeria. Having identified 
the funding provisions in section 30 of the NSIA Act to be inconsistent with 
the provision of section 162(3) of the Constitution, it is recommended that 
section 162(3) of the Constitution be amended to read thus: 
Any amount standing to the credit of the federation account shall 
be distributed among the federal and state governments, and local 
government councils in each state and the sovereign wealth funds 
established under the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (Es-
tablishment, etc) Act, Cap N166 LFN, on such terms and in such 
manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.
It is also recommended that the legal framework for the SWF (the NSIA 
Act) should be re-enacted by the National Assembly, by realigning the pro-
visions of the NSIA Act with the socio-economic needs of the citizens. For 
example, Angola, a member of OPEC and a major oil producer in sub-Sa-
haran Africa, established its SWF in 2011 to invest the nation’s wealth do-
mestically and abroad. The Fund, Fundo Soberano de Angolano (FDSEA), 
has a mandate to promote the socio-economic development of Angola and 
generate wealth for the country’s future generations. Angola’s SWF has a 
78 JO Adésínà, ‘Social Policy and the Quest for Inclusive Development: Research Findings 
from Sub-Saharan Africa’ (May 2007) Social Policy and Development Programme Paper 
No 33, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, iii. 
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broad mandate to invest in the real sector of the economy and provides for 
a social charter to tackle certain identified socio-economic problems of that 
society such as healthcare, clean drinking water and skilled and technical 
education. Nigeria’s SWF, on the other hand, has the mandate to undertake 
investments in low-yielding assets/infrastructure, which may not have direct 
impact on the socio-economic wellbeing of citizens. Herein lies the need for 
a change in the legal framework for Nigeria’s SWF.
Aladejare: Legal Status of Sections 10 and 12 of The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act
